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Dissent on the periphery? Island Nationalisms and European integration 
 
Eve Hepburn and Anwen Elias 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many scholars have identified stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) as 
ardent supporters of Europe. This support has been explained as a result of positive 
developments in supranational integration that convinced these actors that Europe 
could facilitate the achievement of their territorial demands. Other work, however, 
leads to an expectation that SNRPs that mobilise within island regions that are 
geographically distant from the European centre of power (Brussels) will adopt more 
Eurosceptic positions. This article aims to test these competing hypotheses about the 
positioning of SNRPs on Europe. It does so by examining the attitudes of SNRPs in 
two island regions in the Mediterranean: Corsica and Sardinia. The findings suggest 
that SNRPs in both places can not be adequately categorised as either Europhile or 
Eurosceptic. The article examines the role of several context- and actor-specific 
factors in shaping the complex positioning of island nationalists in Corsica and 
Sardinia on the issue of Europe.  
 
 
Introduction 
From the late 1980s, calls for a ‘Europe of the Regions’ won the support of stateless 
nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs)1 across Europe (De Winter and Gómez-
Reino 2002; De Winter and Lynch 2008; Elias 2008a,b; Hepburn 2008, 2010). It was 
hoped that a regionalised Europe comprised of stateless nations and peoples would 
eventually replace that of an intergovernmental Europe with power wielded by states. 
In response, many SNRPs altered their self-determination goals to fit the evolving 
European context: the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru in Wales, the Catalan 
Convergència i Unió, Union Valdôtaine and the Flemish Volksunie perceived the 
European Union (EU) as an alternative framework to the state for pursuing self-
determination (Lynch 1996; Guibernau 1999; Elias 2006, 2008; Hepburn 2006, 2010; 
McGarry and Keating 2006).  
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For this reason, SNRPs are generally presented as ardent supporters of 
European integration (Hix and Lord, 1997; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks et al, 
2002). Jolly (2007: 114), for example, finds that ‘regionalist political parties are 
consistently Europhile across issue area, region and time’. Although in reality the 
picture is much more nuanced than this, whereby Eurosceptical SNRPs such as the 
Lega Nord exist alongside their pro-European counterparts, and a number of SNRPs 
have at various times developed ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ responses to integration processes 
(see Elias 2008a; Hepburn 2010), most scholars maintain that the majority of SNRPs 
are generally supportive of Europe. Scholars have offered several explanations for the 
pro-European attitudes of SNRPs. Keating (2001: 225) demonstrates how SNRPs 
have sought to take advantage of the changing ‘opportunity structures’ presented by 
spatial rescaling at the European level to enhance regional autonomy. Marks and 
Wilson (2002) maintain that SNRPs, which seek to undermine the legitimacy of state 
institutions in their claims to nationhood, have supported European integration 
precisely because it has eroded the powers of the state. Lynch (1996) argues that 
SNRPs look favourably on the efforts of European institutions to promote minority 
languages and cultures. Furthermore, Jolly (2007) argues that market integration may 
make small states or autonomous regions more viable economic entities. Together, 
these arguments posit that positive developments in supranational integration have 
convinced SNRPs that Europe can facilitate the realisation of their territorial 
demands.  
However, other work gives good reason to expect that SNRPs, especially in 
island territories, may not necessarily always be strong supporters of Europe. For 
example, Berezin and Díez-Medrano (2008) demonstrate that geographical distance 
from the EU’s centre of power (Brussels) decreases support for European integration. 
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People living in territories on the extreme periphery of Europe, and which have a 
strong sense of national identity, are more likely to be mistrustful of Europe. Such 
mistrust may be especially pronounced in peripheral island territories where 
globalising processes are perceived to be in constant tension with island insularity, as 
they represent a ‘totalizing trend’ that levels territorial boundaries (Baldacchino 2004; 
Clark 2004). Globalisation and supranational integration may also be perceived as a 
modern form of colonialism for islands with a colonial past, which often develop 
‘discourse of resistance’ to defend their autonomy (Hay 2006: 28-9). This is evident 
in the fact that every island member-state of the EU, as well as several island regions, 
have negotiated special arrangements safeguarding their jurisdiction over matters that 
are perceived as vital to their culture and society (Warrington and Milne 2007: 390). 
As such, insularity is seen to be an important variable affecting political responses to 
European integration. Owing to the physical separation of island regions from the 
mainland, this leads to a degree of isolation in the evolution of island society and 
politics, as well as dependence (or interdependence) on larger political actors 
(Baldacchino 2004; Warrington & Milne 2007). While islands arguably constitute just 
one type of periphery (others include territories isolated simply by distance or 
geographical barriers such as mountains, i.e. Alpine territories), island scholars 
maintain that there is something unique about political and social processes on islands 
resulting from their physical boundedness. This body of literature thus leads us to 
expect SNRPs in island contexts to be more anti-European than Europhile.  
This article examines the European positions of SNRPs in two extreme 
peripheral insular territories: Corsica and Sardinia. In doing so, it seeks to test two 
competing hypotheses about the European attitudes of such parties towards Europe. A 
first hypothesis expects Corsican and Sardinian SNRPs to be Europhile (because of 
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the opportunities presented by European integration to meet their territorial demands). 
A second hypothesis expects these parties to be more prone to Euroscepticism (given 
their island status and geographical distance from Brussels). Thus, we seek to test 
whether insularity is an important variable shaping the responses of SNRPs to Europe. 
The choice of cases is motivated by several considerations. Both Corsica and Sardinia 
are autonomous regions of two of the EU’s largest member-states: France and Italy. 
Both islands are geographically distant from Brussels, in addition to being separated 
from the European mainland by the Mediterranean Sea. Each island also has a history 
of self-governance interspersed by conquest and colonisation. Moreover, they are 
home to Italy’s oldest nationalist party and the largest stateless nationalist movement 
in France. Finally, both islands are geographically distant from Brussels in addition to 
being separated from the European mainland by the Mediterranean Sea: the capital of 
Corsica – Ajaccio – is 1048km from Brussels whilst Cagliari – Sardinia’s capital – 
lies 1344km away. Indeed, Corsica and Sardinia are both closer to North Africa than 
to Brussels. Our focus on these cases will thus enable us to test scholarly claims about 
the Europhilia of SNRPs in contexts that are physically isolated from the symbolic 
centre of the EU project.   
The article begins by providing background information on the political, 
economic and constitutional positions of Corsica and Sardinia. The following section 
tests the hypotheses presented above, by exploring the response of SNRPs on the 
extreme periphery of Europe to the challenges and opportunities posed by deepening 
European integration. The findings demonstrate that these parties’ responses to 
European integration are not unconditionally supportive of Europe, but neither are 
they straight-forwardly Eurosceptic. The complex positioning of SNRPs in Corsica 
and Sardinia is explained as a function of several context- and actor-specific factors 
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that have led to distinct patterns of interaction with European integration processes. 
The article concludes by considering the significance of these findings for the study of 
SNRPs in other island regions in Europe, as well as for the study of SNRP attitudes 
towards Europe more generally. 
 
The Island Nations of Corsica and Sardinia 
Islands have not generally attracted the attention of political scientists, despite 
representing the archetypal ‘periphery’ in centre-periphery studies as a ‘body of land 
surrounded with water which is inescapably isolated from and peripheral to 
continental areas’ (Royle 2001: 42). And yet, islands are extremely valuable units of 
analysis for the study of territorial politics. On one hand, they comprise self-contained 
territorial systems, which provide an excellent testing ground for examining how 
territory confines, shapes and informs politics. At the same time, the defining 
characteristic of islands – their insularity or ‘islandness’ – requires a certain degree of 
interdependence with external actors (Baldacchino and Milne 2000). Insularity or 
islandness may be defined ‘as the dynamics of the natural boundary and the resulting 
island qualities, including elements geographical (for example, degree of separation 
from a mainland), political (often expressed through tensions between autonomy and 
dependence on a mainland jurisdiction) and social (such as islander identity and sense 
of place)’ (Jackson 2008).  
Island scholars argue that the special characteristics of islands make them 
quite distinct from other forms of (peripheral) territories. According to Baldacchino 
(2004), the spatial separateness and ‘geographical precision’ of small islands 
encourages forms of governance and political dynamics that are quite idiosyncratic. 
For instance, insularity has led many islands such as Åland, Bermuda, the Canary 
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Islands, the Isle of Man and Tasmania to share their sovereignty with larger states 
(though a number of secessionist movements have emerged to contest these relations, 
for instance in Papa New Guinea and Fiji). Other scholars have focussed on the social 
aspects of insularity. For instance, Hache (1998: 47) believes that the geographical 
characteristic of insularity is used by islanders in order to assert a distinctive identity 
and to justify demands for enhancing their economic, social, cultural and political 
situation, whilst Hay (2003: 203) believes that the water boundary is conducive to 
psychological distinctiveness, because it promotes clearer, ‘bounded’ identities.  
Yet whilst many scholars have argued that islands possess unusual 
characteristics, in this article we envisage islands to lie on a centre-periphery 
continuum – at the far side of ‘peripherality’. This does not mean that islands do not 
share aspects of peripherality with other non-island territories (we believe they often 
do); instead, it means that the experience of peripherality and isolation is enhanced to 
the greatest extent in the island context. As such, we seek to explore whether and how 
extreme peripherality – which we understand as situations of insularity – has shaped 
island party responses to Europe.  
In this analysis, we focus on a particular type of island entity: island regions. 
For the purposes of this paper, an ‘island region’ is a water-bound territorial entity 
situated at an intermediate level between local and statewide levels. Island regions 
may also possess legislative powers, a degree of political autonomy, and a strong 
sense of national identity, which are evident in both our cases. The French island of 
Corsica and the Italian island of Sardinia, which are separated by only 15km of water, 
share a number of similar geographical, social, cultural and economic traits. These 
include a similar pre-history based on the megalithic civilisation which provides a 
sense of cultural distinctiveness, and a common legacy of conquest and colonisation, 
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due to their strategic military and trade positions in the Mediterranean. Both islands 
are regularly referred to as stateless ‘nations’ by political and social elites. Their 
inclusion into the state-building ventures of France in 1769 and Italy in 1861, and the 
subsequent state economic exploitation of resources on the islands, means that 
Corsica and Sardinia have also shared a history of dependency on the state. 
 
Corsica 
Corsica was a Genoese colony until 1768, when the island was sold to France in 
response to a declaration of the island as a sovereign nation by the Corsican patriot 
Pascal Paoli in 1755 (Loughlin 1989; Caratini 2003). The French army swiftly 
asserted control over its newly acquired territory, and Corsica’s status as an island 
region without any special recognition of its historical, cultural and linguistic 
specificities remained largely uncontested until the post-World War Two period. 
From the 1950s onwards, a state programme of economic modernisation initiated a 
period of dramatic economic growth (Loughlin 1989: 138-145). However, the fact 
that this economic growth was seen to benefit only ‘continental’ French interests, in 
addition to the environmental fall-out of modernisation, provided the conditions for 
the emergence of nationalist contestation. Two nationalist movements emerged in 
Corsica that demanded full recognition of the Corsican nation (Elias 2008a: 111-113): 
a moderate wing represented from 1977 by the Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC), 
which demanded further political autonomy for Corsica within the French state; and a 
more radical wing was born with the Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse 
(FLNC) in 1976. Inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideas and the experience of anti-
colonial movements, the FLNC adopted a strategy of political violence in pursuit of 
the national liberation of Corsica.  
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Nationalist mobilisation drove French authorities to propose several reforms to 
deal with the ‘Corsican problem’ (Briquet 1998). In 1982, President François 
Mitterand, oversaw the approval of the Statut Particulier, which established a 
Corsican Assembly, with responsibilities for administering the social, cultural and 
economic affairs of the island (Loughlin 1985). A second Statut Joxe in 1991 enlarged 
the competencies of the re-christened Collectivité Territoriale de la Corse and 
reformed all electoral lists. Prior to the creation of a regional political arena, Corsican 
SNRPs had been excluded from democratic politics, since representation within 
statewide elected bodies was monopolised by the island’s two historic clans. Within 
the devolved assembly, moderate and radical SNRPs quickly established themselves 
as the island’s second political force. They collectively won 24.9% of the vote in 
regional elections in 1992, though the FLNC had the greatest electoral success.  
A third wave of institutional reform was launched by Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin in 1999. However, provisions for enhancing the legislative powers of the 
Corsican assembly were declared unconstitutional by the French Constitutional Court, 
and abandoned by President Jacques Chirac in 2002. In a 2003 referendum, Corsican 
voters also rejected proposals to create a single political and administrative body for 
the island, with formal but limited legislative powers in areas such as the economy, 
the environment and transport.2 This defeat was a heavy blow for all of Corsica’s 
SNRPs, which had supported further reform as a step towards greater autonomy. The 
result nevertheless fuelled an electoral alliance between moderate and radical groups 
ahead of the 2004 regional elections, called Unione Naziunale. By mid 2007, 
however, the partnership succumbed to internal tensions between moderates and 
radicals. A new alliance of moderate nationalist groups – Femu a Corsica - was 
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formed to contest the 2010 regional elections, and achieved an unprecedented 21.57% 
of the Corsican vote, and 11 of the 51 seats in the Corsican Assembly.  
   
 
Sardinia 
Sardinia officially joined the newly created Kingdom of Italy in 1871 after exercising 
autonomy in the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont. Like Corsica, Sardinia was 
progressively integrated into the Italian state, leading local intellectuals to refer to 
Sardinia as an ‘aborted nation’ (Clark 1989). State integration fuelled a nationalist 
movement in the aftermath of the First World War. The Partito Sardo d’Azione 
(Psd’Az: Sardinian Party of Action) won 40% of the vote in regional elections in 
1921, which sought to resist assimilation into the Italian state and instead pursue a 
meaningful form of autonomy for the Sardinian nation. Nationalist success led state 
authorities to grant Sardinia ‘special status’ in the Italian constitution of 1948, along 
with Sicily and the three ethno-linguistic border-regions of Northern Italy. Sardinia’s 
Statute of Autonomy comprised exclusive legislative powers in certain area like 
agrarian reform, extensive administrative powers and some financial autonomy. Most 
importantly, the Statuto contained a unique reference to the state’s commitment to the 
island’s ‘economic and social renaissance’. As Clark (1989) argues, the autonomy 
granted to Sardinia in 1948 in fact masked the island’s request for, and dependence on 
material concessions and modernisation’. Since then, debates about the questione 
nazionale sarda have continued unabated (Cesare 1990; Milia 2001). 
Like Corsica, a number of economic modernisation programmes were 
introduced by the Italian state from the 1960s onwards to replace Sardinia’s 
traditional pastoral economy with high-technology industries such as petrochemicals, 
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steelworks and oil refineries (Mattone 1982; Casula 2005; Hospers and Benneworth 
2003). However, as the industrial plants failed to provide many jobs and pollution was 
rife, people turned against the ‘cathedrals in the desert’. This degenerated into 
banditry and kidnapping in the mountain areas of Sardinia (Melis 1982), and spurred a 
reinvigorated nationalist movement focused on valorising Sardinian identity. On the 
back of a cultural ‘neosardismo’ movement that sought to valorise the language, 
identity and traditions of the Sardinian nation, the Psd’Az recovered its electoral 
fortunes, which had dipped to 6-7% of the vote as a result of its participation in 
unpopular Christian Democratic coalition governments. Following an upsurge in 
identity politics in the 1980s, the party was able to capture over 15% of the vote. 
However, at the same time the Psd’Az suffered from internal problems, due mainly to 
disagreement between the independence-seeking and pro-federalist wings, which 
splintered the party in the late 1990s. Since then, Sardinia has witnessed the 
emergence of two radical independence-seeking SNRPs: Sardigna Natzione (SN) and 
Indipendènzia Repùbrica de Sardegna (IRS). The competition between these three 
parties ultimately fractured and weakened the nationalist vote.  
 
European integration and stateless nationalism in the Mediterranean  
The deepening of European integration in the 1980s was met with a mixed response 
from political actors in Sardinia and Corsica. Whilst some SNRPs were supportive of 
European integration from the outset, others vigorously opposed supranational project 
as too centralising, too distant, and too unrelenting on peripheral economies. 
However, changes in European regional policy, the creation of EU committees tasked 
with alleviating problems of insularity, and the prospects for autonomy within a 
regionalised Europe changed the attitudes of SNRPs in these two places. 
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Corsican nationalism 
For moderate Corsican SNRPs, such as the UPC, Corsica’s geographical location 
within the Mediterranean and its historical experience at the heart of European trading 
routes, made the island European by default (Elias, 2008: 115). A deep-rooted 
ideological Europeanism translated into a keen interest in the implications of 
European integration for the future territorial status of the island. Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, the focus of the UPC was on the political implications of European 
integration for generating new pressures on the French government to devolve 
political autonomy to Corsica. In contrast, economic integration was perceived to be 
of little importance, since this would be unlikely to undermine the state’s stranglehold 
on the island’s economic decision-making.  
With no regional institutions prior to 1982, and with traditional clans’ 
monopoly of parliamentary representation at the state level (Elias, 2008a: 117), the 
UPC viewed Europe as an arena within which to publicise its territorial demands. The 
UPC established contacts with international organisations and other like-minded 
SNRPs in Europe, campaigning for ‘an internal statute of autonomy’ for the Corsican 
nation within a ‘democratic and progressive Europe of the Peoples’ (Arritti 1978). 
The reform of European regional policies and the creation of a legal framework for 
protecting minority rights in the 1980s reaffirmed the UPC’s belief in the inevitability 
of the emergence of a regional Europe (Elias 2008a: 121-122). The UPC’s success in 
electing an MEP in 1989, and its membership of the European Free Alliance (EFA), 
meant the party had access to a new supranational arena within which to publicise 
Corsica’s territorial marginalisation within the French state.  
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Radical Corsican SNRPs took a very different position on Europe.  Unlike the 
UPC, the FLNC rejected Europe as an alternative arena within which Corsican self-
determination could be realised. Inspired by struggles of national liberation against 
colonialism in the Third World, the FLNC demanded a ‘rupture’ from the French state 
and the creation of a new model of society inspired by Corsica’s independent past 
(Elias, 2008a: 116). Even though European integration was not a prominent concern 
during the late 1970s and 1980s, the FLNC rejected it as a process that was driven by 
the same capitalist and imperialist interests that had exploited Corsica for over 250 
years (U Ribombu 1984). The Single European Act, for example, was denounced on 
the grounds that it would only accelerate Corsica’s economic, cultural and social 
decline (U Ribombu 1987).  
By the early 1990s, moderate and radical nationalist attitudes towards Europe 
had not changed significantly. The French referendum on the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was an opportunity for nationalists of all colours to 
formally state their positions on the future direction of European integration. The UPC 
remained an enthusiastic supporter of the European project, and viewed the treaty as 
an important step towards a federal Europe of the Regions. The FLNC (known from 
1991 onwards as the ‘FLNC ‘canal historique’) rejected the treaty on the grounds that 
its proposals would be damaging to Corsican interests. In contrast, nationalist groups 
that had split from the FLNC between 1989 and 1991 (see Crettiez 1999: 124) 
positioned themselves as either Euro-enthusiasts or Euro-rejectionists. The FLNC 
‘canal habituel’ adopted a position in defence of a regional Europe akin to that of the 
UPC, while Accolta Naziunale Corsa (ANC), campaigned for a ‘no vote’ because of 
the crippling costs of integration for Corsica. The ANC instead advocated closer co-
operation between the islands of the Mediterranean. 
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By the late 1990s, the issue of Europe had varying degrees of importance for 
different nationalist groups. The UPC’s failure to re-elect its MEP in 1994 deprived it 
of the only platform from which it could articulate its nationalist demands. Within the 
Corsican political arena, the UPC also lacked the electoral clout to shape the insular 
political agenda. This was wielded instead by the radical nationalists, with Corsica 
Nazione (CN) as the main group representing this tendency from 1992 onwards.3 
CN’s electoral success and new institutional status prompted a revision of the FLNC’s 
long-held Euro-rejectionist position. By the mid 1990s, the party was calling for a 
‘Statut de Territoire d’Outre Mer’4, whereby bilateral conventions with the EU would 
allow the island to ‘benefit from Community funds while escaping the destructive 
effects of the Common Agricultural Policy and its system of quotas’ (U Ribombu 
1994). This proposal was replaced in 1998 with the goal of ‘independence in Europe’.  
CN’s symbolic rhetoric was accompanied by a new interest in the EU’s 
institutional set-up and policies. Firstly, the party stressed the importance of European 
regional funds for an under-developed Corsican autonomy, and based its support on 
the continued receipt of Objective 1 funding.5 CN’s electoral growth had seen the 
party adopt the clientelisitic practices of its clanist competitors and thus support for 
European regional funds was driven by an instrumental desire to shore up the party’s 
electoral support (Lefevre 2000: 270; Giudici 1997; Crettiez 1999). A tradition of 
political patronage, rooted in the fact of insularity and the resultant opportunity for 
selected political ‘families’ to serve as a linkage between the state and the physically 
isolated Corsican citizenry (Briquet, 1997), thus contributed to shaping nationalist 
responses to Europe. Secondly, CN sought to use Europe to exert pressure on the 
French state to devolve further powers to Corsica. The party used visits to Brussels 
and meetings with European officials as a way of highlighting Corsica’s lack of 
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access to state-level decision-making, and the failure of French authorities to respond 
to insular problems. Among the issues raised were the inadequate transport links to 
mainland Europe and the need for sensitive development of the island’s economy. 
This instrumental interest in specific institutional and policy dimensions of actually-
existing Europe was adopted by the Unione Naziunale alliance during the 2004 
regional elections (Elias 2008a: 133). A European discourse characterised by demands 
for the protection of Corsica’s EU regional aid and better representation in Brussels 
was a key theme of the alliance’s founding documents, and continued to feature in its 
rhetoric in subsequent years.  
However, this renewed interest in Europe should not be construed as a new 
commitment to a shared vision of a regional Europe. Firstly, the nationalist movement 
remains divided on the role Europe can play in achieving self-determination. Whilst 
the PNC and other pro-European parties applauded the draft European Constitution as 
a further challenge to the centralised French state, the majority of radical nationalist 
groups voted to reject the text as it failed to make progress towards a Europe of 
Nations without States. Only CN was divided on what position to take, due to a 
tension between opposition to the document’s substantive proposals and the feeling 
that a ‘yes’ vote would be more appropriate for a party of aspiring government.6 
Secondly, the European dimension remains a minor issue in Corsican nationalist 
politics. References to either a ‘Europe of the Peoples’ or a ‘Europe of Nations 
without States’ are confined to occasions such as European elections or referenda. The 
election of the PNC’s François Alfonsi as an MEP in the June 2009 European 
elections7 will give new prominence to the Europhile agenda of moderate Corsican 
nationalists, anchored in the twin themes of Corsican autonomy and sustainable 
development of the island’s economy. In this context, there has been renewed interest 
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in defending a Union of the Mediterranean, a loose initiative to promote European 
investment in Mediterranean economies and cultures (PNC, 2008). However, such 
debates have not altered the general disinterest in Europe among nationalists focused 
first and foremost on insular politics and the on-going struggle for autonomy from the 
central state. A limited engagement with Europe is symptomatic of an inward-looking 
political culture, and a divided nationalist movement that is more concerned with 
advancing the nationalist struggle at home than with European efforts at polity-
building. It is the state (rather than Europe) which remains the key target of island 
nationalists’ demands, since it is only the former that can realistically deliver self-
determination for Corsica (Martinetti, 2009).  
 
Sardinian nationalism 
From the creation of the first European institutions in the 1950s, many Sardinian 
parties were sceptical about the supranational project, which was viewed as another 
form of distant authority that was dominated by Northern European interests (Cardia 
1982: 188). This was compounded by the fact that Sardinia’s first experience of 
European economic integration was of ‘a cruel and cutting form’ (ibid). Owing to the 
requirements of the Common Agricultural Policy, traditional pastoral areas were 
supplanted by modern ‘agro-zootecnica’ producing meat and dairy products, which 
was resented by the local population. Political debates during the first elections to the 
European Parliament in 1979 revolved around how to make modernisation less 
destructive of the traditional ways of life in Sardinia (Cardia 1982: 189).  
This situation changed in the 1980s, however, with the reform of the European 
Regional Development Funds, which sought to increase competitive potential of 
deprived regions. As Sardinia, like Corsica, is one of the poorest regions in Europe, it 
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also qualified for Objective 1 status. SNRPs saw European involvement in Sardinia’s 
economy as a way of overcoming the island’s economic and political dependence on 
the state. In contrast, the main statewide parties – in particular the ruling Christian 
Democrats – discovered that European structural funding served to reinforce their 
position of patronage. After decades of Sardinia’s political elite making the trade-off 
between ‘real autonomy’ for the regional distribution of patronage and resources from 
Rome, clientelism still persisted with Objective 1. EU cohesion policies in the post-
1992 period were badly implemented and money was wasted due to the corruption of 
the regional political class. In particular, European funds were siphoned off to the 
politicians or businessmen who were given responsibility for implementing local 
development programmes (O’Neill 2005; Hepburn 2010).  
While Italian statewide parties in Sardinia rarely looked beyond the economic 
ramifications of European integration, there was a strong tradition among moderate 
Sardinian nationalists of looking to Europe as a broader context for their claims to 
political autonomy. Similarly to the Corsican UPC, the Sardinian Psd’Az had 
consistently supported European political integration, and articulated the goal of 
Sardinian autonomy as part of the creation of a wider ‘Europe of the Peoples’. The 
Psd’Az was a founding member of the European Free Alliance (EFA) and it 
participated in the European Parliament during 1984-94. Mario Melis MEP – a former 
President of the Region – played a significant role in developing proposals for the 
Committee of the Regions, and was one of the most vocal advocates of a regionalised 
Europe. Melis used his new political platform in Strasbourg to highlight Sardinia’s 
economic plight and struggle for self-determination, as in the case of the Corsican 
SNRPs. However, even Melis was critical of the undemocratic structures of the EU 
and the “aggregation of the interests that gathered together in the triangle between 
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Milan, Paris and Bonn…with the devastating penalisation of all of southern Europe’ 
(quoted in Lepori 1991: 125). Melis argued that a Europe of the States should be 
replaced with a decentralised Europe of the Regions (Melis 1994). The party sought 
the recognition of stateless nations and peoples in a European federation, whereby 
‘Sardinia will be able to constitute, with other regions, a subject of Europe that has its 
own institutional importance in the ambit of the EU organisation’ (Psd’Az 2000). This 
is similar to UPC demands, whereby regional autonomy within the state and Europe is 
envisaged, in a type of ‘European Federation of the Peoples’ (Psd’Az 2003).  
However, the party also acknowledges that particular aspects of European 
integration have presented major challenges for Sardinia, whose greatest handicap is 
one of physical isolation, i.e. transportation and communications with the rest of 
Europe are highly difficult and costly. In response, the party has proposed a number 
of Mediterranean-focused strategies to offset the problems of insularity. The Psd’Az 
supports a Mediterranean zone of free exchange to offset the economic costs of 
extreme peripherality, and the construction of an oil pipeline between Sardinia and 
Algeria in order to address the island’s lack of oil resources8 (Psd’Az 2004). 
Furthermore, the Psd’Az has demanded a form of ‘territorial continuity’ with the 
mainland to address the island’s inability to endorse the European principle of free 
movement of goods, capital and peoples (Psd’Az 2004: 6). By this it means the 
reduction of obstacles to efficient communication, such as transportation costs to and 
from islands, to put them on a level playing-field with other mainland regions.  
To provide an overarching political and legal framework for its Mediterranean 
economic plans, the Psd’Az argues that Sardinia should be given the right to instigate 
direct relations with the national community of states with which the EU has a treaty 
of association, i.e. the countries in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle 
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East. The party welcomes a federal or confederal Mediterranean structure in which its 
autonomy was guaranteed. Here, Sardinia could also assume a key role in acting as a 
‘bridge’ between Europe and Northern Africa (Psd’Az 2003). 
More radical nationalist parties in Sardinia have also adapted their 
constitutional goals to include the European dimension. The roots of SN are in the 
neo-sardist movement of the 1960s, which was based on an anti-colonialist rejection 
of the Italian political establishment inspired by the nearby struggles for national 
liberation in Africa. This type of radical nationalism re-emerged in the 1990s with the 
birth of SN in 1994. SN argues that the only way for Sardinia to break free from its 
position as a colony of the Italian state is to achieve independence alongside other 
island-states such as Malta and Cyprus.  
However, the party’s goal of independence in Europe does not mean that it is 
content with actually-existing Europe and the philosophy underlying the single 
market: ‘the real battlefield is not Italy, but Europe, and in this arena, if we do not 
wish to be the first victims of liberalism, there is need to combat the signs of 
liberalism’.9 SN wants to rid the EU of its perceived neoliberal bias and the influence 
of multinational companies in its quest for Sardinian independence. This would 
enable Sardinia to take economic policy into its own hands, for example by creating a 
zona franca ‘to create equal opportunities for Sardinian businessmen’ and an entrance 
tax (tasso d’ingresso) for non-residents and non-Sards, moneys that will be invested 
in tourism, safeguarding the environment and the agro-pastoral economy (SN 1999). 
SN also looks towards the Mediterranean basin for developing its networks. For 
instance it is engaged at the European level through alliances with Corsica Nazione 
and the Basque party Herri Batasuna, which even agreed to ‘represent’ the SN in the 
European Parliament in 1999-2004 when Sardinia did not have a representative.  
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IRS has taken its cue from the SN to include the European dimension into its 
demands for independence. IRS was formed by disgruntled SN members in 2002, 
who have pursued a similarly radical approach to independence. The party seeks to 
portray itself as a new bottom-up political movement that has nothing in common 
with the regional clientelist class that has bought and sold Sardinia’s autonomy over 
the decades through systems of patronage (IRS 2005). The party’s goal is for 
‘Sardinia in Europe as an independent Republic with its own representatives and its 
own social and economic rights, like many small nations that are entering the EU with 
dignity and decision-making powers’ (IRS 2004). IRS also supports the creation of 
closer linkages within the Mediterranean (IRS 2004). However, there are very few 
substantive references to how an independent Sardinia would function in Europe, no 
specification of whether the IRS prefers a confederal or federal Europe, or very little 
analysis of EU policies. Despite this, the IRS is involved in European activities but 
works outside the ‘mainstream’ networks, such as organising meetings of the 
European Social Forum, and engaging in bilateral relations with the Catalan ERC.  
Yet more important to radical SNRPs is the continuing battle with the Italian 
state. SN has launched a concerted campaign against the perceived economic and 
environmental exploitation of Sardinia by Italian authorities. The party vehemently 
opposed the Italian government’s decision to put American military installations on 
the island, where bombing and other nuclear and chemical tests were carried out to the 
destruction of the tourist and fishing industries. IRS also vehemently criticised the 
government’s creation of pollution in Sardinia through dumping nuclear waste on the 
island (SN 1996; IRS 2005). These campaigns indicate that Sardinian SNRPs remains 
more focused on extracting concessions and demands from the Italian state, and 
nurturing trade and political networks that are closer to home in the Mediterranean, 
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than substantive engagement with the institutions of Europe. This is largely because 
the EU was seen by parties as a distant and bureaucratic structure demanding adhesion 
to its laws and regulations rather than as a tangible opportunity to advance political 
projects; and there was no direct representation of Sardinia in Europe owing to the 
European Parliament electoral law in Italy whereby Sardinia must share a 
constituency with the much larger Sicilian region. Instead, many SNRPs have sought 
to turn Sardinia’s main handicap of insularity into a resource, by exploiting its central 
position with the Mediterranean and acting as a.link between Europe with North 
Africa. This is also where many Sards believe their economic future lies – in trade and 
cultural agreements with Tunisia, Algeria and Libya. 
 
Explaining different island responses to European integration 
SNRPs in the island regions of the Mediterranean have developed highly complex 
responses to deepening European integration. Moderate nationalists in Corsica and 
Sardinia have always been ideologically committed to the pursuit of autonomy within 
a broader European framework. In line with many other SNRPs elsewhere in western 
Europe (Lynch, 1996; Elias, 2009; Hepburn 2010) the UPC and Psd’Az saw several 
institutional and policy developments at the supranational level during the late 1980s 
and 1990s as heralding the emergence of a regional Europe. Elections to the European 
Parliament from 1979 offered Corsican and Sardinian parties direct access to 
European institutions; the election of UPC and Psd’Az representatives to Strasbourg 
enabled the parties to pursue their territorial interests at the supranational level. Both 
parties also supported moves towards creating a Committee of the Regions in 1992, 
which offered Corsica and Sardinia further institutional representation. More recently, 
the PNC defended a ‘yes’ vote for the draft European Constitution in May 2005 (the 
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PsdAz did not take a position as the document was not put to a referendum in Italy), 
and the election of a PNC MEP in 2009 once again provided a valuable supranational 
platform for articulating the party’s autonomist demands.  
In contrast, during the 1970s and 1980s, radical Corsican and Sardinian 
SNRPs opposed the European project as a capitalist venture that would exacerbate the 
economic under-development of the insular economies. FLNC/CN and SN modified 
their Euro-rejectionism during the 1990s, in favour of qualified support for European 
integration. However, this was an instrumental change of rhetoric due more to the 
pressures of party competition and the receipt of EU structural funds, than to specific 
developments in European integration (Elias 2008a: 131). Importantly, these parties 
remain highly critical of many of the institutional/policy aspects of Europe.  
Based on these observations, the hypothesis positing the innate pro-
Europeanism of SNRPs must be qualified in these two cases. Island SNRPs are not 
unconditionally supportive of European integration across time, space and policy area. 
Whilst some SNRPs have been shown to be ideologically committed to the idea of 
European integration, others opposed the European project in principle. The 
moderation of this anti-Europeanism during the 1990s was a function of the perceived 
economic benefits received by the substate nation. This indicates a strongly 
instrumental and opportunistic approach to Europe, with party positions shifting as the 
costs and benefits of European integration are perceived to vary over time.  
At the same time, the second hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
geographical distance and support for the integrationist project must also be qualified. 
Although parties in these two peripheral regions were concerned about being further 
peripheralised and adversely affected by the new centres of political and economic 
power in Europe, at times SNRPs – especially those of a more moderate persuasion – 
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were enthralled at the opportunities presented by a regionalised Europe. Both the UPC 
and Psd’Az were staunch advocates of a ‘Europe of the Peoples’ and sought to import 
a more positive European dimension to political debates in their respective territories. 
How can the complex positioning of SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia on 
European integration be explained? Far from being wholly Europhile (because of the 
opportunities for stateless nations within Europe) or Eurosceptic (because of their 
distance from Brussels and their island status), Corsican and Sardinian SNRPs have 
moved back and forth on questions of European integration. The following section 
seeks to identify factors that account for this variation in island SNRP responses to 
Europe. As noted in the Introduction, most scholarly accounts of this party family’s 
Europhilia have stressed the primacy of European-level factors, such as positive 
developments in European integration. Here, however, we argue that context-specific 
factors have been equally, if not more, important in determining island SNRPs’ 
varying responses to Europe. Some of these factors – party ideology, relations with 
the state, and economic status of the stateless nation – have been shown to shape 
SNRP attitudes towards Europe in other non-insular territories (Elias, 2008a; 
Hepburn, 2010). However, two other important factors, namely, clientelism in island 
political cultures and a Mediterranean island perspective, is specific to these cases, 
and has exerted a distinctive influence on SNRP interpretations of the opportunities 
presented by European integration.  
 
Party Ideology 
Island SNRP positioning on Europe has been influenced by party values and 
identities. The distinction between radical and moderate SNRPs in both Corsica and 
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Sardinia serves to distinguish between two very different sets of ideological 
preferences which have indelibly shaped party attitudes towards Europe.  
On the one hand, the post-Marxist, anti-system SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia 
during the 1970s and 1980s adopted positions that were hostile towards a process of 
economic integration driven by the forces of market capitalism. The anti-Europeanism 
of the SN and FLNC was a natural extension of a more general ideological rejection 
of the extant domestic political regime. Although these positions were moderated 
during the 1990s, the tradition of anti-Europeanism continued to inform the 
scepticism of radical SNRPs towards many of the EU’s institutional/policy 
dimensions. On the other hand, moderate SNRPs espoused a deep-rooted 
Europeanism which defined the parameters of principled support for the European 
project. This ideological predisposition to some kind of European framework for 
Corsican/Sardinian autonomy motivated each party’s support for a Europe of the 
Peoples, and informed their efforts to articulate their territorial demands at the 
supranational level. It is from this perspective that key developments in European 
integration from the 1970s onwards were considered to be positive steps towards the 
creation of a European framework that recognised the rights of stateless nations. 
 
Relations with the State 
Island SNRP responses to European integration have been significantly affected by 
their relations with the state. Both Corsican and Sardinian SNRPs have articulated a 
strong grievance of being either exploited, or abandoned, by political authorities in 
Paris and Rome. In particular SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia strongly opposed the 
perceived environmental exploitation of the islands by French and Italian governing 
authorities, with some portraying themselves as ‘econationalist’ parties. 
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 At the same time, however, the island nations’ different positions within the 
state have affected SNRP attitudes towards Europe. In Corsica, traditional clans’ 
monopoly on representation within the French Parliament, and the absence of a 
regional tier of government prior to 1982, forced SNRPs to develop alternative 
strategies to advance their territorial demands. For moderates, the European arena 
provided a political space within which such demands could be articulated; in 
contrast, the FLNC shunned Europe and instead employed political violence as a 
means of negotiating entry into a closed political system (Crettiez, 1999: 67). Changes 
in the institutional opportunity structure at the regional level from 1982 onwards had a 
significant influence on party re-positioning on Europe. In particular, CN’s emergence 
as a major player in the Corsican political arena by the 1990s prompted the 
moderation of its discourse in favour of an instrumental Europeanism.  
In contrast, Sardinia’s autonomy is guaranteed in the Italian constitution and 
SNRPs have participated in regional elections since they were first introduced in 
1946. For this reason, radical Sardinian SNRPs (represented by SN and IRS) were 
never compelled to adopt the strategy of political violence pursued by their Corsican 
counterparts, although they shared an ideological sympathy with anti-colonial 
struggles. For the Psd’Az, however, and in spite of the presence of a regional tier of 
government during the post-war period, the European arena nevertheless still 
represented an external support structure for the pursuit of SNRP demands. Especially 
from the 1980s onwards when the party struggled to maintain its electoral presence in 
Sardinian politics the European Parliament was an invaluable platform for articulating 
demands for autonomy. Both Psd’Az and the Corsican UPC, therefore, developed 
strategies for the ‘Europeanisation’ of the nationalist struggled which sought to 
maximise the interest-articulation opportunities available at the supranational level. 
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These differences in constitutional architecture aside, state relations also 
affected the degree to which ‘Europe’ was central to nationalist strategies to win 
greater self-determination. In both cases, the European dimension was of limited 
salience in nationalist politics because of the overwhelming focus on relations with 
the state as the main avenue by which autonomy could be enhanced. This is ironic 
since all SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia initially adopted their pro/anti EU positions 
in an effort to liberate themselves from the state. 
 
Economic Insularity 
As noted earlier, Jolly (2007) has argued that SNRP support for European integration 
rests on their belief that Europe enhances the economic viability of regional 
autonomy. However, whilst this may be true of stateless nations that are economically 
prosperous, it does not hold for the two underdeveloped island nations examined here. 
SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia were initially very much opposed to the economic 
impacts of European integration on their island economies, which relied heavily on 
agriculture, suffered from failed state-driven efforts at industrialisation, and struggled 
with problems of unemployment and population decline due to emigration. In Corsica, 
the UPC did not consider European integration to offer an economic lifeline for the 
island, whilst the FLNC was deeply concerned with the negative effects of free-
market economics. Likewise, the Psd’Az acknowledged that European economic 
integration presented major challenges as Sardinia was hampered by the free 
movement of goods, capital and peoples (Psd’Az 2004: 6). The CAP was also 
perceived by SNRPs to undermine the islands’ traditional pastoral economies.  
Moreover, the instrumental Europeanism of SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia 
since the 1990s was driven by the increase in receipt of European regional monies, 
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rather than a reconsideration of the opportunities for economic viability as part of a 
European single market. SNRP support for European integration was thus dependent 
on the receipt of financial transfers from Brussels. In both places, however, the 
prospect of losing eligibility for such regional funds has been decried by SNRPs. A 
cessation in the tangible financial benefits of integration was met with more critical 
SNRP positions on Europe, which lament the failure of the EU to remedy the 
backwardness of the Corsican and Sardinian economies.   
 
Clientelism and Patronage 
A number of island scholars have noted that the lack of anonymity on small islands 
can foster nepotism, patronage, and political clientelism (Royle 2001). This was 
evident in both cases, whereby mainstream parties regularly rewarded individuals and 
groups for their support in exchange for state resources. The presence of powerful 
clientelistic networks and systems of political patronage in both islands has affected 
SNRP responses to European integration in Corsica and Sardinia in important ways. 
Firstly, clan monopoly of the electoral process in Corsica, and the dense networks of 
political patronage of governing Sardinian parties, ‘closed’ the regional political 
systems to outside political players. Consequently, SNRPs were forced to search for 
other ways of articulating their nationalist demands.  
For the UPC and Psd’Az, this meant turning to Europe as an alternative 
political system to access, whilst for the FLNC/CN, this resulted in political violence 
against the closed nature of the system. After the creation of a regional political arena 
in Corsica in 1982, nationalists have had to compete against the clans for votes and 
control of the island’s political institutions. A consequence of this is that SNRPs – and 
CN in particular - which had initially mobilised against the corruption of clientelistic 
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practices have ended up adopting similar modes of operation to survive in a political 
system dominated by such behaviour. CN’s support for European regional funds can 
be understood in large part as a function of its need for financial resources to 
distribute in exchange for political patronage. In Sardinia, the Psd’Az also became 
part of the patronage system, engaging in coalition governments with the centre-right 
and centre-left. As an indicator of the extent to which these parties have assumed the 
practices of the political cultures in which they are active, both CN and Psd’Az have 
been associated with pilfering of European structural funding (Guidici 1997; Crettiez 
1999; Casula 2005; O’Neill 2005; Hepburn 2007; Elias 2008: 235). In response to the 
‘clientalisation’ of politics, other SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia have sought to 
present themselves as ‘new’ parties with no ties to traditional, corrupt elites.  
 
The Mediterranean perspective 
A final element that has mediated SNRP attitudes towards Europe has been the 
political and economic ‘lens’ of the Mediterranean. For island SNRPs – especially 
IRS, SN and CN – the Mediterranean provided an alternative framework to Europe 
for strengthening trade and cultural cooperation, which – importantly to these parties 
– was not directed by bureaucrats and multinational companies in Brussels. This 
Mediterranean perspective manifested itself in various ways.  
On one level, SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia maintained close political ties. 
SN has developed a number of bilateral contacts with other nationalist parties the 
Mediterranean, such as in Catalonia, and its relations with CN are extremely close – 
such that, when the SN added the word ‘Indipendenzia’ to its party name in 2001, so 
did its Corsican sibling. On another level, SNRPs in both islands have incorporated a 
Mediterranean dimension into their territorial projects. SN, IRS and Psd’Az have all 
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referred to the creation of a ‘Mediterranean of the Peoples’ in which to exercise 
Sardinian autonomy that sits within, or provides a more easily accessible substitute 
for, a Europe of the Regions (Hepburn 2008a). In Corsica, a similar Mediterranean-
centric vision has been defended by smaller radical nationalist parties, such as the 
ANC, who remain ideologically opposed to European integration. However, whilst 
mainstream radical and moderate parties have also expressed a desire to work more 
closely with other Mediterranean islands to promote shared interests and goals, the 
initiative in this respect has largely been taken by the island’s two largest clans.1 The 
exclusion of Corsican SNRPs from government, and the growing interest of the clans 
in European affairs since the mid 1990s (Elias, 2008: 135) has meant the latter have 
been in the best position to develop Mediterranean networks.  
As was evident in the cases, SNRPs in both cases maintain that their islands 
are uniquely placed to act as a bridge between southern and northern European 
cultures, and to compete in Mediterranean markets. This will enable the island nations 
to forge a new role for themselves in Europe and the world by bringing together the 
diverse political and economic contexts obtaining in the Mediterranean basin, and by 
taking advantage of their geographical positions as cultural and economic ‘trading 
posts’. This, it is hoped, may lead to the development of a Mediterranean of the 
Regions that either replaces, or operates alongside, a Europe of the Regions. 
 
Conclusion  
Whilst some scholars have argued that SNRPs are consistently Europhile across issue 
area, region and time, others have posited that distance from Brussels, and the fact of 
insularity, are more likely to fuel mistrust of supranational integration. The findings 
                                                 
1 For instance, Jean Baggioni of the clan Rassemblement pour la République, was at the forefront of  
the creation of IMEDOC (Islands of the Western Mediterranean) (Elias, 2008: 135). 
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presented here suggest that neither of these propositions on their own capture the 
complex attitudes of Corsican and Sardinian SNRPs towards Europe. 
On the one hand, moderate SNRP support for European integration has been 
principled and consistent, and calls for a ‘Europe of the Regions’ echoed similar 
demands made by other SNRPs across western Europe. Obstacles to the articulation 
of their territorial demands at the regional level – because no level of regional 
government existed in Corsica prior to 1982, and because of the limited electoral clout 
of moderate nationalists in Corsica and Sardinia from the 1980s onwards – led both 
the UPC and Psd’Az to look towards Europe for an arena within which their territorial 
demands could be pursued. On the other hand, radical nationalist groups in both 
places initially rejected the idea that economic integration could enhance the viability 
of the island economies, fearing instead the detrimental impact of the single market. 
The adoption by CN, SN and IRS of a more Euro-realist position from the 1990s 
onwards was indicative, not of a policy-reversal, but of an instrumental strategy to 
capitalise on European monies. 
This development in SNRP attitudes towards Europe is not necessarily 
confined to island regions. Other recent work has found SNRPs across Europe have 
moved back and forth on the issue of European integration, in response to perceived 
opportunities for, or challenges to, enhancing their territorial autonomy (see Elias 
2008a, 2009; Hepburn 2010). As noted above, these perceptions have also been 
shaped by party ideology, the structure of the state within which stateless nations 
exist, and the economic status of the national territory. However, the empirical 
findings also indicate that insularity or ‘islandness’ is a relevant variable in 
influencing Corsican and Sardinian SNRPs attitudes towards Europe. Insularity 
affects the types of demands being made by SNRPs with regard to processes of state 
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restructuring. Thus, for example, insularity enhanced the perception of the state as 
distant and domineering, augmented the strength of anti-colonial sentiment (linked to 
their proximity to African struggles for independence) which engendered a distrust of 
European political structures. Moreover, the existence of strong clientelistic networks 
of political patronage owing to the isolation of these territories from the mainland 
indelibly shaped the instrumental Europeanism in evidence among Corsican and 
Sardinian SNRPs. In both cases, there has also been an interest at different times in 
the notion of the islands acting as a ‘bridge’ to Africa and the rest of the 
Mediterranean, either as an alternative to Europe (in the case of the ANC) or as an 
alliance of solidarity within the EU (the PNC, Psd’Az, SN and IRS). These aspects 
were not found (or not emphasised to such a great extent) in other non-island cases 
that have been examined elsewhere, such as in Scotland, Wales, Bavaria and Galicia 
(Elias 2008a; Hepburn 2010). The insular context within which SNRPs in our two 
cases responded to European integration – peripheralised and isolated from the 
debates in Brussels – thus contributed to these actors’ limited engagement with the 
detail and implications of European laws and policies. 
The findings presented here suggest two avenues for further research. Firstly, 
this article has focused on explaining SNRPs’ positioning on European integration in 
two peripheral island regions. But the extent to which these explanations hold in other 
cases of peripheral nationalist mobilisation requires investigation. The most obvious 
comparators are other insular nationalist movements in Europe, such as the Azores in 
Portugal and the Canary Islands in Spain. However, to fully test whether a 
geographical water boundary has a real effect on attitudes to Europe, it would also be 
valuable to extend the analysis to non-island peripheral territories, such as those in 
Central and Eastern Europe or in the Alpine valleys. As we argued above, islandness 
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is just one form of peripherality; it would therefore be interesting to test our 
hypotheses in other regions that are ‘remote’ from Brussels. Extending the scope of 
comparison in this way will enhance our understanding of how SNRPs which are 
distant from Europe perceive and interpret developments in European integration that 
elsewhere have been considered to bolster the territorial demands of such actors.  
Secondly, our shift of focus away from European-level factors to context-
specific factors shaping SNRP attitudes towards Europe marks a clear break from 
existing scholarly analyses. We have focused here on the impact of party ideology, 
relations with the state, economic resources, and political culture on parties’ 
positioning on Europe. Future work should examine to what extent these are also 
factors that shape other SNRP attitudes towards supranational integration processes 
across the regions and stateless nations of Europe. Doing so would help to determine 
whether insular territories are any different from other cases of substate nationalist 
and regionalist mobilisation, or whether there is indeed something special about the 
politics of island regions. 
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1 We employ the terminology of nationalist and regionalist parties in the footsteps of Botella (1989), 
Keating and Loughlin (1997) and Pallarès, Montero and Llera (1997). These authors maintained that 
nationalist and regionalist parties should not be treated as entirely separate movements, as they share a 
unifying commitment to self-determination and substate territorial empowerment. We draw on the 
arguments used to justify the use of this term, as set out in Hepburn (2011), which include: its emphasis 
on the territorial (rather than ethnic) aspects of self-determination goals; its ability to capture the 
changing self-determination goals of parties in this family; its ability to account for various party self-
identifications as nationalist or regionalist; and the fact that it enables us to include and compare parties 
that are rarely brought together (as some are seen as ‘regionalist’, i.e. the CSU, others are seen as 
‘nationalist’, i.e. the SNP, whilst others still use the language of nationalism and regionalism, i.e. the 
Psd’Az). Furthermore, we employ the term ‘stateless’ nationalist parties to distinguish these substate 
actors from majority nationalist parties operating on a state level, i.e. Swedish People’s Party. This 
terminology draws on the concept of ‘stateless nationalism’ (Guibernau 1999; Keating 2004). 
2 The new territorial assembly would replace the two administrative regional councils on the island. 
3 CN was created as an electoral alliance between moderate and radical SNRPs in 1992. However, the 
refusal of some radicals to denounce the use of violence led to the withdrawal of moderates from the 
alliance. As a result, CN became the electoral front of radical SNRPs, with close links to the FLNC 
‘canal historique’.  
4 Designation as a Territoire d’Outre Mer (re-named Collectivité d’Outre Mer in 2003) would give 
Corsica the same status as the islands of French Polynesia, Mayotte, and Saint Pierre et Miquelon. 
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5 Eligibility for Objective 1 status requires the regional GDP per capita to be under 75% of the 
European average. Corsica was classified as an Objective 1 region in 1989-93, receiving €138 million. 
In 1994-99, the island saw its allocation of funds nearly double to €250 million (Le Monde 1999). 
6 The party did not adopt a formal position on the Constitution, and allowed its members to vote freely.  
7 Alfonsi was elected as part of a joint list with the French Green Party, Europe Ecologie, in the 
French South-East constituency. 
8 Due to insularity, people in Sardinia must pay over 40% more than other Italians in their energy costs. 
9 ‘Referendum, Ha vinto La Democrazie e L’antiliberalismo’, 28 May 2000, found at 
http://web.tiscali.it/sardignanatzione/novas1.htm. 
